Referring to Mathematical Objects via Definite Descriptions †

<span class="paragraphSection">Linsky and Zalta try to explain how we can refer to mathematical objects by saying that this happens through definite descriptions which may appeal to mathematical theories. I present two issues for their account. First, there is a problem of finding appropriate pre-conditions to reference, which are currently difficult to satisfy. Second, there is a problem of ensuring the stability of the resulting reference. Slight changes in the properties ascribed to a mathematical object can result in a shift of reference and this leads to various problems, <span style="font-style:italic;">e.g.</span>, it makes inferring knowledge much harder than it is.</span>

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